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The duality of farm structure in Moldova is manifested by the existence of a 
relatively small number of large corporate farms at one extreme and a very large 
number of small and very small family farms at the other. “Medium-sized” fam-
ily  farms,  the  backbone  of  any  market  agriculture,  virtually  do  not  exist  in 
Moldova. Moldovan agriculture is characterized by a much greater concentra-
tion of land in large farms than agriculture in market economies. The small in-
dividual farms on the whole are more productive and more efficient than the 
large corporate farms. They produce higher incomes for rural families than cor-
porate farms. The main conclusion of the paper is that land should be allowed to 
flow from large corporate farms to small family farms through the medium of 
land markets until an equilibrium is established between the two farm sectors at 
a new level closer to that observed in market economies. 
Keywords:  farm  structure,  efficiency,  productivity,  land  fragmentation,  land 
concentration, farm size, Moldova. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Privatization of agricultural land and assets followed by restructuring of collec-
tive and state farms were among the primary goals of Moldova’s transition to a 
market-oriented economy in the post-Soviet space (LERMAN et al., 1998). Dur-
ing the first phase of land reform between 1992 and 1998, state-owned land was 
privatized through the distribution of landownership certificates to more than 
one million rural residents (30% of Moldova’s population). The second phase of 
land reform began in 1998 and led to a sweeping conversion of the paper cer-
tificates to physical plots, averaging less than 1.5 hectares. The share of agricul-
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tural land in state ownership dropped from 100% in 1990 to less than one-third 
in 2003, much of it held in state reserve for future reallocation to individuals.  
Progress with land privatization did not produce a commensurate shift to indi-
vidual or family farming. Less than half the landowners who received physical 
plots as a result of the land reform decided to farm their land independently 
(DSS, 2004a). The rest (57%) leased their land to operators, including so-called 
“leaders” or “managers”, i.e., enterprising individuals who founded new corpo-
rate farms by consolidating the dispersed small plots of passive landowners. 
Today there are about 1,500 corporate farms – limited liability companies, joint 
stock companies, agricultural production cooperatives – with an average size of 
400-800 hectares. These new corporate farms are substantially smaller than the 
traditional collective and state farms, which averaged 2,000-3,000 hectares in 
1990, and they use private land, not state-owned land. 
The distribution of land to the rural population led to dramatic changes in the 
structure of land use by farms of various organizational forms (Table 1). Par-
ticularly notable is the shrinking share of former state and collective farms and a 
corresponding increase in land used by the individual sector. Thus, in 1990, 
more than 90% of the 2.5 million hectares of agricultural land in Moldova was 
managed by corporate farms (about 30% by state farms and 60% by collective 
farms). The individual sector (household plots at that time) cultivated less than 
9%. As of 2003, the individual sector (which now consists of household plots 
and peasant farms) controls 40% of the agricultural land. Approximately the 
same land area is operated by large-scale corporate farms, mostly new organiza-
tional forms with private ownership of land and assets. These new corporate 
farms  are  basically  corporate  shareholder  structures  with  joint  cultivation of 
land.  The  traditional  collective  farms  practically  disappeared  during  the  last 
decade, as many of them have been privatized or liquidated, while others regis-
tered in new legal forms. State farms still persist, but they operate in highly spe-
cialized areas that can be legitimately regarded as a public good (seed selection, 
livestock selection, experimental stations, agricultural education and research). 
Table 1:   Structure of Agricultural Land Use in 1990 and 2003* 
  1990  2003 
State sector (state farms and reserve land)  32.1  27.4 
Corporate forms (private sector)  59.5  32.5 
Individual sector  8.5  40.1 
Total agricultural land  100.0  100.0 
     ‘000 ha  2562.2  2528.3 
* End of year data, percent of agricultural land, including Transnistria. 
Source: State Cadastre Agency, land balance tables; transposed to end of year.       3   
While corporate farms average 400-800 hectares, the individual farms (house-
hold plots and peasant farms) are much smaller. Thus, the average peasant farm 
has 1.9 hectares and only 342 peasant farms (out of some 300,000 in total) are 
larger than 50 hectares (DSS, 2004b). Half the agricultural land in Moldova (ex-
cluding Transnistria) is in units smaller than 10 hectares (WORLD BANK, 2005).  
The existence of a relatively small number of large corporate farms at one ex-
treme and a very large number of small and very small family farms at the other 
is manifested in the duality of farm structure. “Medium-sized” family farms, the 
pillar of any market agriculture, almost do not exist in Moldova. Yet the rela-
tionship between organizational form and farm size is not always single-valued. 
Family farms are typically small, but some of them fall in the category of large 
farms. A similar picture is observed with corporate farms, which are typically 
large, but not always. Therefore, the duality of farm structure will be examined 
in two dimensions: the organizational form dimension and the farm size dimen-
sion. 
2   THE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM DIMENSION: CORPORATE FARMS VS. 
INDIVIDUAL FARMS 
Two conflicting scenarios were envisaged in the early 1990s for the outcome of 
land reform and farm restructuring in transition countries. According to one sce-
nario,  the removal of socialist state controls would result in collapse of the 
chronically inefficient collective and state farms and produce a complete shift to 
family farming. According to the second scenario, corporate farms would per-
sist because rural families did not have the required human capital and manage-
rial skills to start independent farming. In reality, none of these scenarios has 
materialized and a large variety of farm structures have emerged in the transi-
tion  space,  spanning  the  whole  spectrum  of  individual  and  corporate  farms 
(LERMAN et al., 2004; SWINNEN, 2006). 
Individual or family farms include very small household plots operated virtually 
by every rural family and somewhat larger peasant farms established by rela-
tively enterprising individuals. Individual farms are managed by the head of the 
household, relying mainly on family labor and family-owned land. They are 
typically small or very small, ranging in size from less than a hectare to about 5-
10 hectares. In contrast, corporate farms are owned by shareholders and man-
aged by hired professional managers. In Moldova and other transition countries, 
the  shareholders  are  typically  the  local  village  residents  who  were  formerly 
members of the local collective farm and received shares in its land and assets. 
Corporate farms typically use land leased from their shareholders and rely on 
hired labour.  4     
The emergence of two well-defined categories of organizational forms as a re-
sult of the post-socialist land and farm structure reforms has triggered an ongo-
ing debate among policy makers and economists concerning the efficiency and 
performance advantages of corporate farms versus individual farms in transition 
countries. The traditional socialist thinking believed in economies of scale and 
thus  gave  preference  to  large  corporate  farms.  The  Western  market-oriented 
thinking attaches more importance to individual incentives and thus emphasizes 
the advantages of smaller family farms. GORTON and DAVIDOVA (2004) note 
that, contrary to prior expectations, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence in 
transition economies that family farms are more efficient than corporate farms 
in all farming activities. While significant differences have been found in favour 
of family farms against the average corporate farm, the best corporate farms still 
tend to perform as well as the best family farms. Yet these findings clearly sup-
port the previous conclusion (LERMAN et al., 2004) that, contrary to the econo-
mies-of-scale school of thought, large corporate farms do not have a significant 
performance advantage over individual farms. We use national statistics and 
survey data to examine the comparative performance of individual and corpo-
rate farms in Moldova. 
Table 2:  Land, output, and labour by farm type 1990-2003 (end of year 
data for selected years) 
 
Agricultural land used by 
farms  Gross Agricultural Output   Employed in agriculture 
 

















1990  2301.8  90.7  9.3  16189  77.8  22.2  610  83.2  16.8 
1995  2196.4  82.7  17.3  10293  59.9  40.1  771  69.2  30.8 
2000  2146.7  56.1  43.9  7917  26.9  73.1  766  23.1  76.9 
2001  2076.0  44.6  55.4  8427  28.4  71.6  764  20.7  79.3 
2002  2069.2  44.1  55.9  8717  29.0  71.0  747  20.6  79.4 
2003  2059.8  46.9  53.1  7535  24.7  75.3  583  23.9  76.1 
Note:  Land used by farms is agricultural land excluding the areas not allocated to agricultural 
producers (the state reserve, miscellaneous state  and municipal lands). 
Source: Statistical yearbooks of Moldova for various years; DSS (2004b).  
The shift of agricultural land from corporate to individual farms noted in Table 
1 has led to significant changes in the production structure of Moldovan agri-
culture: the output of the corporate farm sector decreased, while the output of 
the individual sector shows a steady growth. At the beginning of agricultural 
reforms in the early 1990s, the individual sector was producing 20% of agricul-
tural output on less than 10% of agricultural land; in 2003 individual farms pro-
duce three-quarters of agricultural output on half the agricultural land (Table 
2). The discrepant shares of the two farm sectors in land and output clearly       5   
show that the individual farms use their land more productively than the corpo-
rate farms. This phenomenon has persisted since 1990, as the share of individ-
ual output has always been greater than the share of land in individual tenure 
(Table 2). 
Labour is another basic factor affecting the performance of agriculture. The ag-
ricultural labour in corporate farms decreased sharply over time, while that in 
individual farms increased. In farms of both types the changes in labour use are 
strongly correlated with the changes in land use (the coefficient of correlation is 
greater than 0.95 for 1990-2003). The increase in labour in individual farms, 
especially after 1998, is thus linked with the land distribution efforts during the 
second-phase reforms, which focused on conversion of land share certificates 
into physical plots. The opposite employment trends in corporate and individual 
farms have resulted in a sharp increase of the share of agricultural labour in the 
individual sector – from about 25% in the early 1990s to more than 75% in 
2000-2004 (Table 2). 
The full time series underlying Table 2 were used to calculate the partial pro-
ductivity of land and labour in absolute terms. The partial productivities of land 
and labour decreased over time in both corporate and individual farms, and the 
results are summarized in Table 3 as averages for the entire period 1990-2003 
and for two subperiods. Despite the declining trend, the land productivity of 
individual farms was higher than that of corporate farms (the differences are 
statistically significant for the entire period and for both subperiods). The dif-
ference in labour productivity, on the other hand, is not statistically significant 
for the entire period 1990-2003 and for the latter subperiod 1997-2003. More-
over,  the  direction  of  the  difference  in  labour  productivity  does  not  always 
match  the  findings  in  other  transition  countries,  where  labour  productivity, 
unlike land productivity, is observed to be lower for individual than for corpo-
rate  farms  (a  manifestation  of  the  “labour  sink”  effect  of  individual  farms). 
Thus, the two partial productivity measures for land and labour do not give a 
consistent picture: while land productivity is definitely higher for individual 
farms, the results for labour productivity are ambiguous.  
Table 3:  Land and labour productivity for corporate and individual 
farms 1990-2003 (averages for selected subperiods) 
Productivity of land, ‘000 lei/ha  Productivity of labour, ‘000 lei/worker  Years 
Corporate  Individual  Corporate  Individual 
1990-2003  3.4*  10.1*  14.7  17.4 
1990-1996  4.3*  13.8*  16.2*  22.6* 
1997-2003  2.4*  6.3*  13.1  12.2 
* The differences between corporate and individual farms are significant at p < 0.1 by both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. 
Source: Calculated from full time series underlying Table 2. 6     
To resolve the ambiguity, we have to switch from one-factor partial productiv-
ities to Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is calculated as the ratio of the 
value of output to the aggregated cost of all inputs used. In the absence of mar-
ket prices for valuing the cost of inputs (such as the price of land), TFP is usu-
ally determined by estimating a production function and then using the esti-
mated input coefficients as the weights to calculate the value of the bundle of 
inputs. From considerations of data reliability we have decided to calculate pro-
duction functions using two inputs only: land and labor.  
A qualitative picture of TFP changes over time was obtained from national sta-
tistics by assuming a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function with styl-
ized factor shares of 0.7 for land and 0.3 for labour (these are the factor shares 
that we consistently obtained in production functions estimated using various 
farm surveys in Moldova). Figure 1 presents the TFP results calculated with 
these land and labour weights using the full time series underlying Table 2. The 
TFP for individual farms is higher than for corporate farms over the entire pe-
riod 1990-2003. The respective means for 1990-2003 are 11.5 for individual 
farms and 4.4 for corporate farms (the difference is statistically significant). 
Figure 1:  Total factor productivity for individual and corporate farms 
1990-2003  
Notes:  Inputs  from  national  statistics  (see  Table  2)  aggregated  using  hypothetical  factor 
shares of 0.7 to land and 0.3 to labour.  
The TFP results in Figure 1 are derived by production-function methodology 
using national statistics and they reflect Total Factor Productivity in a sectoral 
perspective. A different methodology can be used to estimate the efficiency of 
specific farms from survey data (at a point in time). The efficiency of input use 
for a particular farm is measured in relation to the production frontier, which is 
the locus of “best attainable” points, i.e., points where the maximum output is 
achieved for every given bundle of inputs. Once the production frontier has 
been  constructed,  we  can  calculate  the  technical  efficiency  of  each  farm  by 
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measuring its relative distance from the frontier. Points on the frontier are tech-
nically efficient; their distance from the frontier is 0, and their technical effi-
ciency (TE) score is 1. As the distance of a particular point from the frontier in-
creases, its TE score decreases. Each TE score is the fraction of the “best per-
former” output that a given farm achieves with the same bundle of inputs.  
Table 4 presents the mean TE scores obtained for farms of different types in 
two samples from 2003 surveys in Moldova.
1 While all farms surveyed are rela-
tively inefficient (compared to the efficiency benchmark of TE = 1), individual 
farms achieve higher TE scores than corporate farms (the difference is statisti-
cally significant in both samples). This indicates that the individual farms on 
average utilize the two inputs (land and labour) more efficiently than the corpo-
rate farms: for any given bundle of inputs they produce on average more than 
the corporate farms. These results are consistent with the TFP results: individual 
farms are more productive and more efficient than corporate farms. 
Table 4:  TE scores obtained by Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)  
  WB 2003 survey   
(n = 198) 
WB 2003 survey pooled with 
PFAP 2003 corporate farm 
survey (n = 719) 
Corporate  0.46
a  (n = 22)  0.67
b  (n = 543) 
Individual   0.64
a  (n = 176)  0.70
b  (n = 176) 
Notes:  
a Difference statistically significant at p = 0.10 by parametric and nonparametric tests. 
 b Difference statistically significant at p = 0.10 by nonparametric test only. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DUDWICK et al. (2005) for WB 2003 survey; 
MURAVSCHI and BUCATA (2005) for PFAP 2003 survey. 
3   THE FARM SIZE DIMENSION: LARGE FARMS VS. SMALL FARMS 
The second dimension of farm-structure duality involves farm sizes – large ver-
sus small. The optimum farm size is difficult to define because opinions about 
the farmers’ objective function differ and because the same determinants can 
affect farm size in different ways across different farms or countries (KOESTER, 
2003). The optimality of farm size for a given country is largely an empirical 
question (SWINNEN, 2006). In general, the optimal farm size is a relative notion 
that depends on the local conditions, such as the share of rural population and 
the land endowment.  
In the absence of a universal optimum, average farm sizes can be meaningfully 
compared only for countries with similar natural conditions. It makes no sense 
to compare the farm sizes in densely populated Moldova to those in Russia or 
                                           
1   The TE scores were derived by Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), an econometric produc-
tion frontier technique that is conceptually close to production function estimation. For de-
tails see COELLI et al. (1998). 8     
Ukraine (both sparsely populated, land-rich countries). While farm sizes in Rus-
sia and Ukraine may be compared to the United States and Canada, an appropri-
ate benchmark for Moldova is provided by the relatively densely populated and 
land-poor European countries, such as Portugal, Greece, and Italy. These three 
countries actually have the smallest family farms among the EU-15 – 5-10 hec-
tares, compared with an average farm size of around 20 hectares for EU-15 as a 
group (Eurostat data from EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2005)). The family farms in 
Portugal, Greece, and Italy are thus not dramatically larger than the average 
peasant farm in Moldova (2 hectares national average, 4-5 hectares in various 
surveys – see Table 5), but they are certainly much smaller than the average 
corporate farm in Moldova (400-800 hectares as mentioned in the Introduction).  
Table 5 presents the size characteristics and the partial productivity measures 
for small and large farms in four recent surveys in Moldova. While the large 
farms as a group are substantially larger than the small farms by all measures – 
output, land, and labour, the partial productivities show a mixed picture:  
•  The partial productivity of land (output per hectare) is higher for small 
farms. 
•  The partial productivity of labour (output per worker) is lower for small 
farms.  
•  The number of workers per hectare is much higher in small individual 
farms than in large corporate farms (the “labour sink” effect of individual 
farms).  
Table 5:  Size characteristics and productivity measures for small and 
large farms in Moldova: survey data 
















tions  176  22  1,166  521  170  180 
Ag land (ha)  4.48  971  4.02  918  5.7  533 
Workers  4.51  332  6.27  150  1.6  43.7 
Ag output (‘000 lei)  25.8  3,230  25.3  2,038  75.4  1,642 
Output/ha (lei)  6,765  2,745  9,535  2,085  6,414  3,145 
Output/worker (lei)  6,857  17,135  5,145  17,824  55,304  54,393 
Workers/ha  1.42  0.26  3.25  0.19     
Note:   All differences between small and large farms are statistically significant at p = 0.1 
(except the differences in productivity of labour – output/worker – in the WB 2000 
survey). 
Source: DUDWICK et al. (2005) for WB 2003 survey; MURAVSCHI and BUCATA (2005) for   
PFAP 2003 surveys; LERMAN (2001) for WB 2000 survey.       9   
The ambiguity in partial productivity measures is resolved by calculating total 
factor productivity (TFP) in the production function paradigm. First, the sum of 
the coefficients in a Cobb-Douglas production function sheds light on the be-
haviour of the returns to scale: the returns are constant to scale if the coeffi-
cients sum to 1; the returns are increasing to scale (i.e., larger is more produc-
tive) when the sum of the coefficients is greater than 1; and finally the returns 
are decreasing to scale (i.e., smaller is more productive) when the sum of the 
coefficients is less than 1. Second, differences in TFP between categories of 
farms can be captured by estimating appropriate production functions with a 
dummy variable for different farm types. If the dummy coefficient for type A 
farms is found to be greater than for type B farms, this implies that type A farms 
produce a greater value of output at any given bundle of inputs and essentially 
means that type A farms have higher TFP than type B farms. This procedure 
enables us to assess differences in TFP without actually calculating the TFP in 
absolute values.  
Simple two-input Cobb-Douglas production functions relating the aggregated 
value of output to land and labour were estimated for the 2003 WB survey with 
198 farms classified into large and small. The two-input production function 
was  first  estimated  without  dummy  variables  (Model  1  in  Table  6).  In  this 
model,  the  coefficients  of  the  two  factors  of  production  (land  and  labour) 
summed to less than 1, and the difference from 1 was statistically significant at 
p = 0.10. The production function thus shows decreasing returns to scale: large 
farms produce less per unit of inputs in the margin than small farms. 
Table 6:  Estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function for large and 
small farms 
Dependent variable:  
value of output (lei) 
Model 1 coefficients  Model 2 coefficients 
Explanatory variables:     
Land (ha)  0.60  0.69 
Labour (workers)  0.30  0.31 
Farm type (dummy): large 
farms relative to small farms  --  −0.58 
Sum of input coefficients  0.90  n.a. 
R
2  0.770  0.773 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on 2003 WB survey from DUDWICK et al. (2005).  
This  conclusion  is  strengthened  and  quantified  by  estimating  the same two-
input  production  function  with  a  dummy  variable  for  large and small farms 
(Model 2 in Table 6). The intercept for large farms (relative to small farms) is 
negative, which means that at each level of inputs (land and labor) large corpo-
rate farms attain lower output than small individual farms (the negative coeffi-
cient was statistically significant at p = 0.10). The mathematics of the Cobb-10     
Douglas production function translates the negative dummy variable coefficient 
of −0.58 into a difference of 45% in output between corporate and individual 
farms for each bundle of inputs. 
4    DISENTANGLING  THE  EFFECTS  OF  ORGANIZATIONAL  FORM  AND  FARM 
SIZE 
We have shown that in Moldova individual farms are more productive than cor-
porate farms and that small farms are more productive than large farms. Typi-
cally, individual farms are small while corporate farms are large, and there is a 
fairly sharp size gap between the farms of two organizational forms (WORLD 
BANK, 2005). It could therefore be argued that the farm size effect observed in 
our analysis is simply a result of the organizational form effect, or vice versa. 
To try and disentangle the two effects, we have looked at two homogeneous 
samples: a sample of corporate farms (without any individual farms) and a sam-
ple of peasant farms (without any corporate farms).  
The homogeneous sample of 521 corporate farms from the 2003 PFAP survey 
(MURAVSCHI and BUCATCA, 2005) was grouped into three size categories (Ta-
ble 7). The productivity of land clearly increases with farm size, whereas the 
productivity of labour does not. Most importantly for our purposes, total factor 
productivity calculated by aggregating land and labour with appropriate weights 
from the production function shows a definite increase with farm size in the 
homogeneous sample of corporate farms. 









Number of farms  238  225  58 
Land productivity (output/ha, lei)  1,927  2,162  2,430 
Labour productivity (output/worker, lei)  18,660  16,580  19,219 
TFP (lei per unit of aggregated inputs)   3,162  3,603  4,167 
Source: Authors’ calculations from MURAVSCHI and BUCATCA (2005). 
In a homogeneous sample of peasant farms from the 2005 WB survey (WORLD 
BANK, 2005), the standard of living of rural families was observed to increase 
with farm size. Here, a qualitative variable characterizing different levels of 
family  well-being  (“comfortable”,  “subsistence”,  “poverty”)  was  used  as  a 
proxy for farm performance in the absence of TFP estimates for this sample. 
Among peasant farms, a comfortable standard of living is associated with much 
larger family farms than lower standards of living. Peasant farmers reporting a 
comfortable standard of living had 11 hectares on average, compared with less 
than 5 hectares for farms in the two lower categories – poverty, when family       11   
income is not sufficient to buy food, and subsistence, when family income is 
sufficient to buy food and daily necessities (the difference between farm sizes is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01). The standard of living of peasant farmers is 
thus an increasing function of farm size, as is commonly observed in farm sur-
veys in CIS and other transition countries.  
A different view of the relationship between standard of living and farm size for 
peasant farmers is presented in Figure 2, which plots the probability of being in 
one of the three standard-of-living levels as a function of farm size. The prob-
ability of being in the highest standard of living (gray curve) increases with 
farm size, while the probability of being on the lowest “poverty” level (thick 
black curve), sharply decreases with farm size.
2 These results provide support 
for increasing the average size of the individual farms through land market de-
velopment and land consolidation policies. 
Figure 2:   Probability of achieving a given standard of living as a function 
of farm size for peasant farmers.  
 
Note:   Definition  of  standard  of  living  levels:  “poverty”  – family income not 
sufficient to buy food; “subsistence” – family income just sufficient to 
buy food and daily necessities; “comfortable” – family income sufficient 
to buy food, daily necessities, and durables. 
Source : Authors’ calculations based on WB 2005 survey (WORLD BANK, 2005). 
These  results  demonstrate  that  farm  performance  actually  improves  with  in-
creasing farm size for farms of the same organizational form. The inverse pro-
ductivity–farm  size  relationship  is  observed  for  mixed  samples  that  include 
farms of different organizational forms (both individual and corporate). This 
suggests that the decrease of productivity with farm size is primarily an organ-
                                           
2   The probabilities of achieving a given standard of living were obtained in a multinomial 
logistic regression with the three-level standard of living as the discrete dependent variable 
and farm size as the continuous covariate. 
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izational form effect, and not a farm size effect: individual farms are more pro-
ductive than corporate farms, and the size effect observed in our analysis ap-
pears to be simply a proxy for the organizational form effect.  
5   LAND CONCENTRATION 
The pronounced difference in average sizes between individual and corporate 
farms in Moldova is reflected in a strong concentration of land in a small num-
ber of very large farms – a feature inherited from the sharply dual farm structure 
of the Soviet period. The Lorenz curve provides a standard tool for visualizing 
inequality of land distribution between large and small farms. Plotting the cu-
mulative percent of the number of farms (from smallest to largest) on the hori-
zontal axis and the cumulative percent of agricultural land used by farms on the 
vertical axis, we obtain a curve whose downward bulge below the diagonal pro-
vides a measure of inequality or concentration. In the absence of a country-wide 
size  distribution  for  all  farms  in  Moldova,  we  produced  a  “sample”  Lorenz 
curve ordering by size the 1885 farms included in three 2003 surveys (DUDWICK 
et al., 2005; MURAVSCHI and BUCATCA, 2005). 
The Lorenz curve for Moldova (Figure 3a, black curve) shows that about 70% 
of farms (mostly small individual farms) account for just 1% of agricultural land 
while the remaining 30% of large farms (basically corporate farms) account for 
99% of land holdings. At the top end of the distribution, just 5% of the largest 
farms control 53% of land. 
Although it is not entirely appropriate to compare the somewhat ad hoc sample 
results for Moldova with the systematic Eurostat data for the EU countries, we 
have  nevertheless  superimposed  the  aggregated  land  concentration curve for 
EU-15 on Figure 3a (grey curve). In the 15 countries of the EU combined, 10% 
of the largest farms control 64% of agricultural land compared with as much as 
73% in Moldova (Table 8). On the other hand, the small-farm tail in EU-15 is 
much  thicker  than  in  Moldova,  with  80%  of  the  smallest  farms  controlling 
16.5% of agricultural land compared with only 6.4% in Moldova.
3  
Figure 3b presents the corresponding graphs for Italy, Greece, and Portugal – 
the three EU-15 countries that in our view are the most appropriate for compari-
son with Moldova. In Greece 11% of the largest farms control 54% of land, in 
Italy 7% of the largest farms control 59% of land, and in Portugal 6% of farms 
control more than 70% of agricultural land. Portugal is the country with the 
highest land concentration in EU-15, but even here 80% of the smaller farms 
                                           
3   Land concentration in the EU-15 is increasing over time. In Table 8 both the number and 
the area decreased between 1995-2003 for small and medium-sized farms and increased for 
large farms.       13   
control 14% of agricultural land, compared to less than 7% for the same per-
centage of small farms in Moldova. As a result, 20% of the largest farms control 
93% of land in Moldova and 86% of land in Portugal.  
 Figure 3:  Land concentration curves  
 
Sources:   European countries based on Eurostat harmonized national data and EC surveys 
of  the  structure  of  agricultural  holdings  for  2003  (EUROPEAN  COMMISSION, 
2005); Moldova from WORLD BANK (2005). 
Contrary to the established market economies of EU-15, Bulgaria and Romania, 
two East European transition countries that are now candidates for EU acces-
sion, are close to Moldova by their levels of land concentration: 5% of the larg-
est farms control more than 80% of agricultural land in Bulgaria and about 60% 
of land in Romania (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). In these two countries, as 
in  Moldova,  the  post-Soviet  land  reform  led  extreme  fragmentation  of  land 
ownership, which on the one hand produced large numbers of very small farms, 
while on the other hand encouraged many small landowners to entrust their land 
to large corporate farms.  
Table 8:     Agricultural land distribution by farm size in EU-15 
Holdings, %  Used agricultural land (UAA), %  Farm size class  
(ha UAA)   1995  1997  2000  2003  1995  1997  2000  2003 
0-5  56.9  55.8  57.6  56.6  5.7  5.4  5.2  4.8 
5-10  13.0  13.3  12.3  12.2  5.2  5.1  4.6  4.3 
10-20  10.6  10.8  10.2  10.2  8.6  8.3  7.7  7.2 
20-50  11.5  11.5  10.9  11.0  20.9  19.8  18.6  17.4 
Over 50  8.0  8.6  8.9  9.9  59.6  61.4  63.8  66.3 
Sources:  Eurostat harmonized national data and EC surveys of the structure of agricul-
tural holdings for 2003 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2005). 
The observed results for Moldova fall somewhere between the market model 
and the former Soviet model: the land concentration is not as extreme as in Rus-
sia and Ukraine, which are still very close to the former Soviet model character-
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b14     
ized by sharply dual farm structure, but it is substantially more pronounced than 
in the EU (and also in the US and Canada). To move closer to the market pat-
tern, Moldova has to undergo further farm size adjustment. 
6   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Analysis  based  on  national  statistics  and  survey  data  shows  that  individual 
farms are more efficient than corporate farms. This conclusion does not neces-
sarily mean that corporate farms should be eliminated and replaced with family 
farms. Corporate farms do exist in market economies, which proves that they 
are able to compete with individual farms. The small number of corporate farms 
that do exist in market economies appear to be even more efficient than individ-
ual farms as a group: in the United States, corporate farms control 2% of agri-
cultural land and generate 20% of output (in Moldova, the relationship is re-
versed: corporate farms control 50% of land and generate less than 30% of out-
put). The market economies have achieved an equilibrium farm structure, which 
includes a mix of individual farms (the dominant majority) and corporate farms 
(a small minority) determined by resource availability, managerial capacity, and 
personal preferences of farmers and investors. A similar process can unfold in 
Moldova, but the development of corporate farms must be left to market forces, 
free from government intervention and programming.   
Analyzing the dichotomy between small and large farms, we conclude based on 
several surveys that small farms are more productive and more efficient than 
large farms. This result is based on a mixed sample of both individual and cor-
porate farms, which overall show decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, 
a homogeneous sample comprising only corporate farms shows increasing re-
turns to scale, i.e., among farms of the same type size has a beneficial effect on 
performance. Similarly, in a homogeneous sample comprising only individual 
farms, family well-being increases with farm size. Based on these findings we 
tend to believe that the different behaviour is determined primarily by organiza-
tional form: small farms do better than large farm not because of a size effect, 
but because individual farms (which happen to be small) outperform corporate 
farms (which happen to be large). In this context, the Government of Moldova 
should abandon its preference for large-scale corporate farms and concentrate 
on improving the operating conditions for small individual farms. 
The farm structure in Moldova reveals a much greater concentration of land in 
large farms compared to established market economies. In EU countries closest 
to  Moldova,  such  as  Italy,  Greece,  and  Portugal,  and  even  in  EU-candidate 
countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, large farms control a substantially s-
maller proportion of land. Therefore, to move closer to the farm-structure pat-
tern typical of market economies, Moldova should allow land to flow from large 
corporate farms to small individual farms. This can be accomplished by empha-      15   
sizing the development of land market mechanism, which will simultaneously 
act to increase the average size and to reduce the number of small individual 
farms (284,000 farms is too much for a small country with a population of less 
than 4 million). These processes will reduce the concentration of land in large 
farms, while alleviating land fragmentation and thus bringing Moldova in closer 
conformity with the farm-structure patterns observed in market economies 
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